An Attack on Libert et al.’s ID-Based Undeniable Signature Scheme by Zichen Li et al.
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.5 , No.2, PP.220–223, Sept. 2007 220
An Attack on Libert et al.’s ID-Based
Undeniable Signature Scheme
Zichen Li2, C. F. Chong1, Lucas Chi-Kwong Hui1, Siu-Ming Yiu1,
K. P. Chow1, Wai-Wan Tsang1, H. W. Chan1, and Kelvin K. H. Pun1
(Corresponding author: S. M. Yiu)
Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong1
Pokfulam, Hong Kong (Email: smyiu@cs.hku.hk)
Department of Computer Science & Technology, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454003, PRC2
(Received Dec. 1, 2005; revised and accepted Apr. 7, 2006)
Abstract
In 2004, Libert and Quisquater proposed an identity
based undeniable signature scheme using pairings over el-
liptic curves. In this article, we show that the scheme
is not secure. In particular, if a valid message-signature
pair has been revealed, an adversary can forge the signer’s
signature for any arbitrary message for which the signer
has no way to deny it. More importantly, through this
example, we illustrate that the bilinear property of pair-
ings, although is useful for the design of cryptographic
schemes, is also a source for security ﬂaws.
Keywords: Attack, bilinear pairings, ID-based cryptogra-
phy, undeniable signature
1 Introduction
Undeniable signature was introduced by Chaum and van
Antwerpen in 1990 [2] in which only designated veriﬁers
can validate the signature with a proof token (speciﬁc to
the veriﬁer) generated by the signer. And the signer has
no way to generate a fake token to deny a valid signa-
ture. On the other hand, to simplify key management,
the paradigm of identity based (ID-based) cryptography
was proposed by Shamir [5]. And bilinear pairing over el-
liptic curves is found to be useful for designing ID-based
schemes (e.g. [1]). It is natural to combine the two con-
cepts to construct ID-based undeniable signatures. In
2004, Libert and Quisquater proposed one of an identity
based undeniable signature based on bilinear pairing [4].
In this paper, we show that this undeniable signature
scheme is not secure. In particular, if a valid message-
signature pair has been revealed, an adversary can forge
the signer’s signature for any arbitrary message for which
the signer has no way to deny it. More importantly,
through this example, we want to highlight that while the
bilinear property of pairing is helpful for designing cryp-
tographic protocols, it is also a source for security ﬂaws.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The prop-
erties of a bilinear pairing will be presented in Section 2.
Section 3 reviews Libert et al.s identity based undeniable
signature scheme. The attack will be given in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a
multiplicative group of the same order. A cryptographic
bilinear pairing is a mapping ˆ e : G1 × G1 → G2 that
satisﬁes the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀P,Q ∈ G1, ∀a,b ∈ Z∗
q, we have
ˆ e(aP,bQ) = ˆ e(P,Q)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: ∀P ∈ G1, if P 6= 0, then ˆ e(P,P) 6=
1.
• Computability: The mapping ˆ e can be eﬃciently
computed.
3 Review of Libert et al.’s Iden-
tity Based Undeniable Signa-
ture Scheme
In this section, we review Libert et al.’s identity based
undeniable signature scheme. The scheme consists of ﬁve
algorithms: Setup, Keygen, Sign, Conﬁrm, Deny. The
exact procedures of the algorithms are given in the fol-
lowing.
• Setup:
Given security parameters k and `, the PKG (Private
Key Generator) chooses groups G1 and G2 of prime
order q > 2k, a generator P for G1, a bilinear map ˆ e :
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H2 : {0,1}? × {0,1}` × {0,1}? → G1, H3 : G3
2 → Zq
and H4 : G4
2 → Zq. It randomly chooses a master
key s ∈ Zq and computes the corresponding public
key Ppub = sP ∈ G1. The system’s parameters are
params := {q,G1,G2, ˆ e,P,Ppub,H1,H2,H3,H4}
• Keygen:
Given a user (signer or veriﬁer) with an identity ID,
the PKG computes QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1 and the
associated private key dID = sQID ∈ G1 which will
be transmitted to the user.
• Sign:
To sign a message M ∈ {0,1}∗,the signer Alice with
identity IDA and private key dIDA computes γ =
ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),dIDA) ∈ G2, where r ∈ {0,1}` is a
random string picked by Alice. Then, the pair (r,γ)
is the signature on M.
• Conﬁrm:
To verify the signature, the designated veri-
ﬁer with identity IDB will run a conﬁrmation
protocol with the signer Alice to produce a
proof (U,v,h,S), where S = R + (h + v)dIDA,
h = H3(c,g1,g2), U ∈ G1,R ∈ G1 and
v ∈ Zq are randomly selected by the signer,
and c = ˆ e(P,U)ˆ e(Ppub,QIDB), g1 = ˆ e(P,R) ∈ G2
and g2 = ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),R) ∈ G2.
To check the validity of the signature, based
on the proof (U,v,h,S) for the signature (r,γ)
on the message M from the signer, the veriﬁer
will ﬁrst compute c0 = ˆ e(P,U)ˆ e(Ppub,QIDB),
g0
1 = ˆ e(P,S)ˆ e(Ppub,QIDA)h+v and g0
2 =
ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),S)γh+v and accepts if and only if
h0 = H3(c0,g0
1,g0
2).
• Deny:
To convince a designated veriﬁer with identity
IDB that a given signature (r,γ) is not a valid
signature, the signer Alice will run the denying
protocol, and produce a proof (C,U,v,h,S,s), where
C = (
ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA), dIDA)
γ )ω, S = V +(h+v)R ∈ G1,
s = v + (h + v)α, h = H4(C,c,ρ1,ρ2),
U ∈ G1,V ∈ G1, v ∈ Zq,ω ∈ Zq, are randomly se-
lected by the signer, and c = ˆ e(P,U)ˆ e(Ppub,QIDB)v,
ρ1 = ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),V )γ−v ∈ G2 and
ρ2 = ˆ e(P,V )y−v ∈ G2, y = ˆ e(Ppub,QIDA),
α = ω, R = ωdIDA.
Based on this proof (C,U,v,h,S,s) for the sig-
nature (r,γ) on the message M from the signer,
if C = 1, the designated veriﬁer will reject
the proof immediately. Otherwise, the veri-
ﬁer will compute c0 = ˆ e(P,U)ˆ e(Ppub,QIDB)v,
ρ0
1 = ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),S)γ−sC−(h+v) and ρ0
2 =
ˆ e(P,S)y−s ∈ G2, y = ˆ e(Ppub,QIDA), and accepts
the proof if and only if h0 = H4(C,c0,g0
1,g0
2).
4 The Attack
Now, we present an attack on Libert et al.’s identity based
undeniable signature scheme. Suppose that an attacker
has the information that (r,γ) is a valid signature, signed
by the signer Alice with identity IDA, for the message M,
then the attacker is able to forge a signature for Alice on
any message M∗ as follows.
1) He picks a random string r∗ ∈ {0,l}`;
2) Computes H2(M∗,r∗,IDA) ∈ G1;
3) Then, computes
k =
H2(M∗,r∗, IDA)
H2(M,r,IDA)
mod q
= H2(M∗,r∗,IDA)H2(M,r,IDA)−1 mod q.
4) Finally, computes γ∗ = γk modq.
The pair (r∗, γ∗) is a forged signature on the message
M∗. The following lemma shows that the forged signa-
ture is a valid signature on M∗ if r∗ is the random string
selected by the signer in Sign algorithm.
Lemma 1. Let r∗ ∈ 0,1` be the random string selected
by the signer in the procedure Sign algorithm of Libert et
al.’s scheme and (r∗,γ0) be the corresponding signature
computed by the procedure. Then, γ∗ = γ0.
Proof. Based on the procedure Sign algorithm of Lib-
ert et al.’s scheme, γ0 = ˆ e(H2(M∗,r∗,IDA),dIDA).
From the revealed message-signature pair, γ =
ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),dIDA) and since γ∗ = γk mod q, based
on the bilinear property of ˆ e, we have the following.
γ∗ = ˆ e(H2(M,r,IDA),dIDA)k
= ˆ e(kH2(M,r,IDA),dIDA).
Note that k = H2(M∗,r∗,IDA)H2(M,r,IDA)−1 mod q,
we have the following.
γ
∗ = ˆ e(kH2(M,r,IDA),dIDA)
= ˆ e(H2(M∗,r∗,IDA),dIDA)
= γ
0.
Thus, Lemma 1 is established.
Lemma 2. Let (r∗, γ∗) be the forged signature generated
by the attacker. Going through the procedure Conﬁrm al-
gorithm, the signer will produce a proof showing that the
signature is valid. On the other hand, the signer cannot
deny this forged signature with the denying protocol.
Proof. Based on Lemma 1, if r∗ is selected by the signer
in the procedure Sign algorithm, then the signature pro-
duced will be exactly the same as (r∗,γ∗). So, a correct
proof will be produced by the signer by executing the
conﬁrmation protocol. Similarly, the signer is not able to
convince the veriﬁer that the signature is invalid using the
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Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we show that the attacker
is able to forge the signer’s signature for any message once
a valid message-signature pair has been revealed.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the identity based
undeniable signature scheme proposed by Libert and
Quisquater is not secure. In particular, once a valid
message-signature pair has been revealed, the attacker is
able to forge signatures of the signer for any message.
Interestingly, while the design of the signature scheme re-
lies on the property of bilinear mapping, the attack is also
based on the same property of the bilinear mapping. As a
remark, we have published a secure version of an identity
based undeniable signature scheme in [3].
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